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Re: [tor-bugs] #5903 [Tor]: Restore ExcludeEntryNodes feature
#5903: Restore ExcludeEntryNodes feature
--------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-relay needs-proposal | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by nickm):
* keywords: tor-relay => tor-relay needs-proposal
Comment:
The tricky parts to get right will be:
* Making sure it applies to entry nodes on the codepath where we pick
guards at random from all guards, AND on the codepath where we pick guards
from configured EntryNodes, AND on the codepath where directory guards are
turned off entirely.
* Deciding whether it applies to anonymous connections only, or to
direct directory requests as well.
* Figuring out what should happen when
* Figuring out what should happen when the user has no consensus
networkstatus document, and they have excluded every authority and
directory source that they know about.
* Figuring out what should happen if a specified bridge is excluded.
* Figuring out what should happen if a bridge is excluded by
fingerprint, but we don't learn its fingerprint until after connecting to
it.
* Refactoring the code and/or adding mocking stubs to the code
sufficient for us to have rigorous testing for all of the above.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5903#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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