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Re: [tor-bugs] #8710 [Tor]: Sybil selection should prefer measured over advertised bw
#8710: Sybil selection should prefer measured over advertised bw
-------------------------------------+--------------------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-auth 024-deferrable | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by nickm):
* keywords: tor-auth => tor-auth 024-deferrable
Comment:
> What security-related attacks are we worried about here? "We could end
up picking a relay with lower measured bandwidth" is the failure mode that
I see?
Well, the current behavior lets the sybil-attacker pick which node they
would like to have appear in the consensus. It also destabilizes the
consensus if the nodes' measured values are less than their advertised
values, since as soon as a new node shows up, it will seem preferable to
all measured nodes.
These don't seem immediately exploitable in any scary way, but I'm not
comfortable leaving in calculations that lead to our making decisions
based on advertised bandwidth. It doesn't have a great track record.
This isn't to say we don't want a solution for #8163 , but rather that
leaving this ticket unfixed is not the solution for #8163.
I guess we could defer this to 0.2.5 along with #8163?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8710#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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