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Re: [tor-bugs] #8239 [Tor]: Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old intro points



#8239: Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old intro points
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma         |          Owner:                    
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-hs       |         Parent:                    
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                    
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 rransom]:
 > > Also, merely reusing introduction points would not make HSes on flaky
 connections work significantly less badly.  Their clients would still have
 to rebuild their rendezvous circuits.
 >
 > I'm focusing on the fact that clients will fetch (or just re-use) the
 old hidden service descriptor, which lists the old introduction points,
 and be introducing themselves to the wrong place.

 If a hidden service chooses new intro points after its Internet connection
 fails, its clients will try the old intro points and find that they no
 longer work, then fetch a new HS descriptor, then successfully reconnect
 to the HS.

 If a hidden service reuses its old intro points after its Internet
 connection fails, its clients will try the old intro points and find that
 they no longer work, then try to fetch a new HS descriptor and find that
 there isn't one, then fail completely.

 If a hidden service could resume its OR connections or circuits at the
 entry-guard end, its clients wouldn't have to do anything to reconnect to
 the HS, and they probably wouldn't notice a disruption at all.  (This is
 not only better for performance, but also better for the HS's anonymity.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8239#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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