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Re: [tor-bugs] #11513 [Tor]: Make UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST non-stupid
#11513: Make UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST non-stupid
------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-client 024-backport tls
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Comment (by nickm):
Here's the FULL list of adequate ciphers provided by openssl 1.0.1:
{{{
[659]$ grep '\(TLS1\|SSL3\)_TXT'
/usr/local/opt/openssl/include/openssl/*.h | grep RSA | grep -v CAMEL
|grep -v RC4 | grep 'DHE\|EDH' |grep -v SEED |grep -v NULL | grep -v EXP
|grep -v DES_64 | sed -e 's/^.*://'
#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-RSA-
AES128-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-
AES256-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-DES-
CBC3-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-
AES128-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-
AES256-SHA"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-
AES128-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-
AES256-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128
-GCM-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-RSA-AES256
-GCM-SHA384"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-
AES128-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-
AES256-SHA384"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128
-GCM-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256
-GCM-SHA384"
}}}
As implicit in that command line, I'm excluding the SSL2 protocol and all
export ciphersuites; I'm excluding the CAMELLIA, SEED, RC4, single-DES,
and NULL ciphers; and I'm requiring ephemeral keys for forward secrecy.
(I tried this with openssl master and openssl 1.0.2, and got the same
lists.)
So our degrees of freedom are: AES vs 3DES, ECDHE vs DHE, GCM vs CBC, and
SHA256 vs SHA384 vs SHA1. We also need to order those by priority.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11513#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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