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[tor-bugs] #15647 [Ooni]: ooni-probe's bridge_reachability tests should require bridge fingerprints for the inputs



#15647: ooni-probe's bridge_reachability tests should require bridge fingerprints
for the inputs
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  isis                                 |          Owner:  hellais
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Ooni                                 |        Version:
 Keywords:  ooni-probe, bridge-reachability,     |  Actual Points:
  dataviz                                        |         Points:
Parent ID:                                       |
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Requiring the input to have bridge fingerprints would help to partially
 fix issues like https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-pipeline/issues/17,
 and it would help to solve the problem where people doing data
 visualisation on the bridge_reachability report data are ''forced'' to
 display data for a bridge based on its IP:port (because no fingerprint,
 and thus no hashed fingerprint, is available). For example, this is
 currently the case for some of the bridges on
 https://beta.chokepointproject.net/measurements/tor-bridge-
 reachability#Bridge_explorer.

 In fact, perhaps the sanitised reports should ''only'' contain the hashed
 fingerprint, neither the fingerprints nor the addresses? (Following the
 principle of avoiding handing others a loaded gun with the safety off.)
 (Although perhaps this should be another ticket.)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15647>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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