Re: [tor-bugs] #15744 [Tor]: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#15744: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?
-------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  SponsorR, tor-hs
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:  #15714
       Points:           |
-------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 The obvious way to explore this problem is to make a hidden service
 statistic for relays that displays a histogram of the number of
 introductions per introduction circuit. Then we can see how many
 introduction circuits see a big number of introductions.

 We have decided that we don't want to do this statistic just yet, because
 that would leak the popularity of some hidden services and we don't fully
 understand the implications of this.

 Here is an alternative plan to move forward with this.

 We collect these statistics on some of our own relays, we analyze the
 statistics, and in the end we publish a report with our findings and
 results. If any of the collected data seems harmful to release, then we
 will try to sanitize it or don't publish it. This seems like a way to get
 some of the results we are looking for, without committing to global and
 forever statistics.

 I can make a branch that collects a binned histogram of the number of
 introductions on a relay. Then we can run the branch on a relay or two for
 a few weeks, and see what we get. Depending on how surprising the results
 are we will decide what to publish in the final report.

 Paradoxically, for the benefit of open science, I think it's OK to discuss
 these results on ephemeral channels like IRC as we usually do, instead of
 doing it in private channels. I think the results are not that harmful if
 we run them on just a relay for a few months, and anyone could do the same
 experiment at home so it's not like we are giving away hard to find
 information.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15744#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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