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Re: [tor-bugs] #21983 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Should we do more to discourage custom prefs and nonstandard addons?
#21983: Should we do more to discourage custom prefs and nonstandard addons?
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Reporter: arthuredelstein | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tbb-usability, tbb-security | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by yawning):
* cc: yawning (added)
Comment:
Maybe?
For what it's worth, `sandboxed-tor-browser` uses a read-only extensions
directory, unless the user explicitly configures it read/write. It
doesn't do anything with prefs, beyond locking certain prefs.
In general my feeling is that if people want to reduce their anonymity
set/get owned because they decied to installing random addons or setting
placebo tinfoil hat prefs they copy-pasted off some blog/forum/whatever,
they should be free to.
I think a different question is, should we have something equivalent to
`/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` so it's blatantly obvious that they voided
their (non-existent) warranty when something breaks.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21983#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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