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Re: [tor-bugs] #21994 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus Health: what is the distribution of a bandwidth authority's measurements?
#21994: Consensus Health: what is the distribution of a bandwidth authority's
measurements?
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Reporter: teor | Owner: tom
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Very Low | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Consensus Health | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by tom):
* cc: nusenu (added)
Comment:
So I'm not sure exactly ewhat this is asking for, or how to implement it.
But as far as bwauth debugging information, what I have wanted/envisioned
are the following:
1. A graph on Atlas, per-relay, that shows each bwauth's votes for that
relay over time
2. Something (maybe a graph) on Atlas, per-relay, that shows which scanner
the bwauth made the measurement on
3. A series of graphs that shows below/median/above bwauth buckets for
relays where each graph only applies to one country's relays.
4. A graph or series of graphs that shows bwauth variance on relays per-
country.
(1) is for relay operators to understand why their bandwidth usage may
have changed without requiring them to do some ugly consensus/vote
grepping. But it requires changes to OnionOO and Atlas.
(2) is also for relay operators, but also bwauth operators, to confirm
that sometimes relays slip between scanner cracks. To perform the analysis
at all, bwauth's need to apply this patch:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/commit/?id=7e4ef735858acf5d2fbb183b6f8418b7fc2b364a
To get it into Atlas, we need the data in OnionOO, and to get the data
into OnionOO we need it in Collector, (#21378) and to get it into
Collector we need it exposed by the bwauths (#21377).
(3) Should confirm (or reject) the hypothesis that some bwauths make more
high or low measurements because their geographic location hurts or helps
them measure a disproportionate amount of the network.
(4) Should confirm (or reject) the hypothesis that maybe, just maybe, our
bwauths tend to agree with similarly-located bwauths for similarly-located
relays.
I'm not sure if any of those is what you said though.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21994#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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