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Re: [tor-bugs] #25061 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays consider it a bootstrapping failure if they can't extend for somebody else's circuit
#25061: Relays consider it a bootstrapping failure if they can't extend for
somebody else's circuit
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner:
| catalyst
Type: defect | Status:
| assigned
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: backport-032, 033-must, stability, | Actual Points:
033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by catalyst):
I'm still looking into how best to do this. I think I'm starting to wrap
my brain around it. What you call '''approach one''' and '''approach
two''' differ in several ways, one of which is I suspect '''approach
two''' would tend to minimize textual changes to existing code (which
might be a reasonable goal for a 0.3.3 patch). A downside of '''approach
two''' is pushing more higher-level state and logic into lower-level code,
so I think it's not the best solution in the long term.
The status quo is that lower-level code has logic to use higher-level
state to decide whether to call `control_event_bootstrap_prob_or()`. I
think we should restructure things so that higher-level code has the
necessary information from lower levels to make this decision, which
weighs in favor of '''approach one'''. Maybe that's best done as a
separate ticket, but I would like to try to make the existing abstractions
cleaner instead of messier.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25061#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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