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Re: [tor-bugs] #25594 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations

#25594: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations
-----------------------------------+------------------------
 Reporter:  arlolra                |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                 |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                 |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                         |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                         |         Points:
 Reviewer:                         |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------+------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 Can somebody summarize the requirements for the interaction between the
 Snowflake client and ~~the broker~~whatever components the client has to
 talk to?

 I see mentions of a TLS handshake above, but I'm hoping to get at the
 underlying requirements, for which "do a TLS handshake" is part of one
 possible approach to meeting the requirements, but once we understand the
 requirements more maybe we'll realize there are others.

 In particular, does it have to be an arbitrary number of round-trip
 interactions (e.g. because we're bundling info from a nat piercing
 protocol that needs arbitrary round-trips) or can we constraint it down
 more?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25594#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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