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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features
#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor
Browser's security features
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Reporter: isabela | Owner: antonela
Type: project | Status: assigned
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804 | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor17
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Replying to [comment:18 tom]:
> I think one of the pain points we have with Tor Browser is the lack of
persistent storage. We are so deathly scared of storing anything to disk
that we can't save user's per-site exceptions to things. Perhaps we should
reconsider this (opt-in of course.) I'd be curious to brainstorm if we
could divine a storage mechanism we actually felt some measure of
confident in. For example: What if we used something like Argon2 combined
with a TPM-backed value? This is bypassable, but it requires on-machine
brute forcing. If we developed something akin to 'Firefox Accounts', we
could enable users the ability to store data on a Hidden Service and
revoke authorization to it. These ideas are very 'out there'.
Or just allow to assign different security slider setting to different
temporary containers (each different container has a new identity, so to
speak)? If the Project Fission thing gets going then there's a different
process for different container and that would solve a lot of security
problems and the UX with containers wouldn't require much work or
difficulty to setup.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25658#comment:19>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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