Re: [tor-bugs] #30164 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Inconsistent Guard flag assignment

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#30164: Inconsistent Guard flag assignment
------------------------------+----------------------------------
 Reporter:  Jaym              |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect            |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium            |      Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |        Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:
 Reviewer:                    |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by arma):

 I believe that we are currently doing things as intended. That is, I think
 when we built the thing that is happening now, we meant to build it that
 way.

 But I agree with you that we should consider changes. See ticket #11327
 for what I think is the same ticket as this one (and even mentions the
 same issue with the Fast flag too, as Aaron points out).

 The problem stems from the fact that we deployed the bwauth measurement
 concept, but then only some authorities started measuring, which creates
 an imbalance where some authorities are more important (and more
 influential) than others.

 For an even more thorough change, check out the idea in #10968: there, we
 point out that the Guard flag, if it's supposed to be based on
 availability of the relay in the past, should be entirely about __whether
 the relay was in the consensus__, not about whether this particular
 authority could reach it at various times in the past. (See also #11328
 here.)

 While we're talking about bugs that probably affect the Guard flag: I
 believe the time-known (and therefore possibly also the WFU) calculation
 is broken somehow. Many more details in #19162 (where I have been hoping
 to assign the HSDir flag only to relays in the top half of time-known, but
 where I'm having trouble following through with that idea because I can't
 figure out what's going on with the time-known calculations).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30164#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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