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Re: [tor-bugs] #28655 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors
#28655: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors
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Reporter: arma | Owner: phw
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Obfuscation/BridgeDB | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: bridgedb | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 2
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor19
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Comment (by phw):
So far, all of leekspin's generated descriptors included obfs2, obfs3,
obfs4, and scramblesuit. This broke BridgeDB's unit tests because all
descriptors included a probing-resistant PT (obfs4 and scramblesuit), so
BridgeDB wouldn't hand out its obfs2, obfs3, and vanilla bridges. To fix
this, I made leekspin generate descriptors with various combinations of
pluggable transports:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/leekspin.git/commit/?id=9af6c71b3b4aeb56c509df9ae6a16650f9b58dd2
Let me know if this patch looks good to you.
Unfortunately, the HTTPS unit tests still break -- apparently randomly.
Here's one of my recent, failed builds: https://travis-
ci.org/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/jobs/520411314
Since my leekspin patch creates pluggable transport combinations
deterministically, I believe that the issue is somewhere in BridgeDB's
HTTPS distribution mechanism.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28655#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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