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Re: [tor-bugs] #33815 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards with meek - do or don't?
#33815: vanguards with meek - do or don't?
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: (none)
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: vanguards | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by mikeperry):
Q1-Q2) I need to look into this more, but meek-azure is not an obviously
bad choice, if it still works. I am pretty sure it does not have cover
traffic protections like obs4, and the azure cloud provider gains at least
all capabilities of the local adversary, and may also gain some network
adversary capabilities too. I also would have to double-check the specific
meek-azure implementation to make sure you still get a properly
authenticated connection to a guard node, or if there is another private
bridge on the back-end (and if so, if that bridge is authenticated with a
fingerprint).
Q3) I was speaking about the protocol, not who ran the bridges (or who has
access to Azure cloud or can compel them).
Q4). For high volume onion services, adding additional local client
traffic is unlikely to help much. I am also reluctant to make this
recommendation in the general case, and that README is not the right place
to go deep into the many different traffic analysis rabbit holes, because
they are not strongly solved. The only reason that README goes as far as
it does is because such a treatment is necessary to understand the effect
and interaction of many options, protocols, other addons, and other
components already provided by the Tor Project.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33815#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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