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Re: [tor-bugs] #31103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
#31103: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
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Reporter: phw | Owner: (none)
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, | Actual Points:
network-team-roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID: #30471 | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor28-must
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Comment (by phw):
Replying to [comment:9 catalyst]:
> Replying to [ticket:31103 phw]:
> > Bridge operators may welcome a similar option for `ORPort`. However,
when setting `ORPort` to auto, Tor attempts to find a new port each time
it starts. This means that operators would have to re-configure their
firewalls after each restart.
>
> By this, do you mean non-PT ("vanilla") bridges? I think there's a
separate ticket(#7349) for PT bridges to be able to disable their `ORPort`
to mitigate some bridge confirmation attacks.
[[br]]
I mean both vanilla ''and'' obfuscated bridges because both expose an OR
port (as long as #7349 isn't fixed yet).
However, if we fix #7349 and obfuscated bridges no longer need an open OR
port, this ticket becomes less relevant.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31103#comment:11>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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