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[tor-bugs] #33955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Selecting "Copy image" from menu leaks the source URL to the clipboard. This data is often dereferenced by other applications.
#33955: Selecting "Copy image" from menu leaks the source URL to the clipboard.
This data is often dereferenced by other applications.
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Reporter: peskydan | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: High | Component: Applications/Tor
| Browser
Version: | Severity: Major
Keywords: information leak, | Actual Points:
unexpected, Firefox |
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Right-clicking an image and selecting "Copy image" from the context-menu
leaks the source URL to the clipboard. In many applications, pasting the
image leads to the URL being dereferenced, and a clearnet web request can
result, instead of the bitmap simply being pasted. This is dangerous and
unexpected behaviour that stems from Firefox.
11 formats are placed on the clipboard during an image copy. 3 of these
contain the URL, 2 of which contain further tag metadata:
49318 'HTML Format' - this contains the entire source HTML of the
<img> element, inside a comment, wrapped in a minimal HTML document, and a
header containing the offsets
49419 'text/html' - this also contains the source HTML of the <img>
element
49426 'application/x-moz-file-promise-url' - this contains the plain
source URL.
While some might argue that this is appropriate in Firefox, it's an
unexpected information leak in the Tor Browser.
My suggestion would be to change the menu items to:
- Copy image
- Copy image location
- Copy image as HTML
**Copy image** would copy only raw image pixels as an uncompressed bitmap.
This ensures there is no metadata in the image, and also ensures that
increasingly common things like WebP don't break everything. It also fixes
unexpected behaviour with respect to dynamically generated or uncached
images, ensuring that what the user sees is exactly what ends up in the
clipboard, without any extra web requests in the target application.
**Copy image location** would copy, in plaintext, the source URL of the
image.
**Copy image as HTML** would copy or create a sanitised version of the
<img> tag (i.e. onclick handlers etc would be stripped, leaving only alt
text, width and height and perhaps eventually a filtered version of any
embedded CSS).
I believe each of those menu options would behave as everyone would
expect, without any unexpected information leakage issues.
(I have set severity as major and priority high, since this has the
potential to deanonymise a user before they realise what's happened, but
is probably a relatively easy fix. Presumably this would be regarded as
the most important kind of bug, but I don't know the convention here.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33955>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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