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Re: [tor-bugs] #1772 [Tor - Tor client]: Counting circuit timeouts when we can't establish any TLS connection
#1772: Counting circuit timeouts when we can't establish any TLS connection
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Reporter: arma | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component: Tor - Tor client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
arma -
A). You're right. I think I am going to revert my fix for #1741 to
explicitly check for 3 hop paths and only count those.
B). The logic to determine if the network is dead is present in
circuit_build_times_network_close() and
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(). cbt_network_is_live() is called
every time we get a cell, and resets the internal counter
cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts to 0. Every time you get to the 95th
percentile on the CBT curve, circuit_build_times_count_close() is called.
It calls the cbt_network_close(), which increments
cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts. circuit_build_times_network_check_live()
is the call that checks this counter, and if it gets above 3, we stop
counting timeouts. If it gets above 6, we throw away the 3 previous
timeouts (which were recorded, but presumably happened when the network
was believed to be down).
If there is a problem in how we decide to stop counting circuits when your
network goes away, it's in that pile of madness. Please have a look at it,
and/or grep your logs for "Network is no longer live" and "Network is
flaky" and other associated logs from those functions.
C). Yes, that's the idea. The purpose should first be non-13 in the first
call to expire. It gets switched to 13, and then is allowed to build until
the timeout value for the 95th percentile on the CBT curve, at which point
circuit_expire_building decides to really kill it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1772#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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