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Re: [tor-bugs] #6549 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Implement "Do Not Track" as privacy-by-design
#6549: Implement "Do Not Track" as privacy-by-design
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Firefox Patch Issues | Version:
Keywords: SponsorZ | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by gk):
* cc: g.koppen@â (added)
Comment:
Hmmm, I wonder how your list above fits to the Torbrowser design document.
E.g.
"Design Goal: DOM storage for third party domains MUST be isolated to the
url bar origin, to prevent linkability between sites."
But there is no such ticket mentioned in your description. My question
propbably boils down to whether disabling features counts as a solution.
That does not seem to be the case as you explicitly mentioned the 3rd
party cookie patch in the description while having 3rd party cookies
disabled in the current bundles. Thus, I guess tickets for applying the
double keying to DOM storage, SSL Session IDs (3.5.6)... are "just"
missing...
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6549#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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