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Re: [tor-bugs] #9546 [Tor]: Link handshake fails with "Received unexpected cell command 10" on a bridge
#9546: Link handshake fails with "Received unexpected cell command 10" on a bridge
------------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Reporter: zwol | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.15-rc
Keywords: tor-bridge tor-client 023-backport | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
------------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Comment(by arma):
skruffy points out that it's weird the bridge isn't sending an
AUTH_CHALLENGE cell.
Our spec says:
{{{
When the in-protocol handshake is used, the initiator sends a
VERSIONS cell to indicate that it will not be renegotiating. The
responder sends a VERSIONS cell, a CERTS cell (4.2 below) to give the
initiator the certificates it needs to learn the responder's
identity, an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell (4.3) that the initiator must include
as part of its answer if it chooses to authenticate, and a NETINFO
cell (4.5).
}}}
Yet our code says
{{{
/* If we're a relay that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
const int send_chall = !started_here &&
public_server_mode(get_options());
}}}
The comment for command_process_auth_challenge_cell() says
{{{
/** Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from an OR connection.
*
* If we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're not the
* originator of the connection), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing a
v3
* handshake, mark the connection. If the cell is well-formed but we
don't
* want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and*
we
* want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO
cell. */
}}}
Why do our bridges decide they're too cool to follow the spec? :)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9546#comment:20>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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