Re: [tor-bugs] #12842 [Tor Support]: Helpdesk needs a PGP key to be able to receive encrypted help queries

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#12842: Helpdesk needs a PGP key to be able to receive encrypted help queries
-----------------------------+-------------------
     Reporter:  mrphs        |      Owner:  lunar
         Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor Support  |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+-------------------

Comment (by mrphs):

 Replying to [comment:1 lunar]:
 > See #12816 for a discussion on how to do that using RT and why I think
 it's a bad idea.

 when a user contacts RT it usually means they were unable to use Tor,
 meaning they're sending a plaintext email over the clearnet on the same
 network they're trying not to use, about their issue.
 Even if we keep the data unencrypted in our database, PGP could still add
 a good layer of protection from their adversary, while their message is
 traveling on the wire.

 > Other options I have experience with are:
 >
 >  * An OpenPGP key where the privacy key is shared by multiple people.
 Painful, as once someone leaves the team, you need to revoke the entire
 key, issue a new one, and redispatch the private key.
 >  * Using [Schleuder](https://schleuder2.nadir.org/), a gpg encrypted
 mailing list system with remailer capabilities. Each message is decrypted
 on a central server (which holds the common private key) and then re-
 encrypted for every recipient. By sending an encrypted and signed message
 to the list, it's possible to add new keys to the list keyring and also
 send replies to outside email addresses. This is how Tails does support.
 Schleuder is ok to use once you've mastered it. But that's a process which
 made some people really unhappy. Also the software is in bad shape right
 now (probably it won't be in Debian Jessie).
 >
 > In any cases, this mean that these OpenPGP-encrypted exchanges would
 likely be out of RT.
 >
 > All of this seems like a lot of pain for little gain. We have a process
 that works pretty much alright right now. I don't see an easy way to
 introduce OpenPGP in there that will not make us loose email, fail to
 follow-up on users, and the like.

 What if we start using PGP in RT (for the reason stated above) in short
 term and slowly get to Schleuder or any other alternative when we're
 ready?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12842#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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