Re: [tor-bugs] #11096 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Randomize MAC address before start of Tor

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#11096: Randomize MAC address before start of Tor
---------------------------------------------------+-----------------------
 Reporter:  csoghoian                              |          Owner:  erinn
     Type:  enhancement                            |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:
 Severity:  Blocker                                |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-triage                           |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                         |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                         |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by nobody):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 I do agree.

 I always run:
  macchanger -r --another eth0

 Unfortunately if I forget to do so, or if the connection fails, the system
 takes the permanent MAC back.

 Furthermore it should be nice if the mac were chosen among a good set,
 where by "good" I mean "compatible" with the used HW

 Ticket #10969 (an old one) says:
 «It's well understood that your set of guard nodes can act as a
 fingerprint.»
 Well, currently I always connect to the very same guard node (which is a
 safe one, btw)
 Can anyone pls clarify this point?

 None the less, may be somebody is behind a router or a wan, so even
 changing his local Mac, wouldn't be enough to mask him...

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11096#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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