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Re: [tor-bugs] #19163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure clients almost always use ntor

#19163: Make sure clients almost always use ntor
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  teor
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608,     |  Actual Points:  5
  review-group-7                                 |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  2.0
 Reviewer:  nickm                                |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:17 nickm]:
 > Re-review:
 >
 >   * I worry about the security of the opportunistic upgrade stuff. It
 has the potential to enable epistemic attacks.
 >
 > Otherwise stuff looks good.

 Yes, I have the same concerns - you could probe a client / hidden service
 to find out which relays it knows about. And it's hard to test.

 Here are our options:
 * We could control opportunistic upgrades with a consensus parameter that
 we only switch on when 0.2.8 is no longer recommended. But this means the
 code won't be tested.
 * We could remove opportunistic upgrades entirely, and only kill off TAP
 when we kill off the old hidden service protocol.

 And separately, for Single Onion Services / Tor2web:
 * We could always do opportunistic upgrades, because it doesn't matter if
 anyone knows what consensus a Single Onion Service or Tor2web client has,
 and it's more important to protect the single-hop link with ntor rather
 than using the vulnerable TAP protocol.
 * Or we could go with either of the above options.

 What do you think?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19163#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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