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Re: [tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
| mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #9001 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| SponsorV-can
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Comment (by mikeperry):
Replying to [comment:12 asn]:
> Replying to [comment:11 mikeperry]:
> > Just FYI - I updated asn's branch to current origin/master and renamed
the option to HSLayer2Guards. It also now applies to all HS circuit
purpose types (not just rends).
> >
> > New branch location is mikeperry/prop247_torrc-rebased.
> >
> > Adding HSLayer3Guards next. After that, we can play with stem +
onionperf.
>
> Sounds good. Took a look at the code and looks reasonable. WRT to:
>
> {{{
> * XXX: Hrmm.. HSDIR fetches might be CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENRAL.. How do
> * we differentiate those?
> }}}
> perhaps you can check for the `rend_data` field on the
`origin_circuit_t` if you have access to that.
I don't yet. What I did instead was to set a special purpose for HSDIR
fetches. Was tricky, but seems to work. I pushed a couple of commits for
this and am now testing it with stem.
Also, I noticed that because this patch disables cannibalization, it makes
building predicted circuits for hidden services pointless. We also need to
alter circuit_predict_and_launch_new() to build the correct purpose
breakdown for the HS purposes we need for prediction to do anything for us
here... This might impact performance of the prototype. Bleh.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13837#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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