Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services (was: creating padlock states for .onion services on tool bar)

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different
padlock states for .onion services
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 Reporter:  isabela                   |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  project                   |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team                   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Description changed by linda:

Old description:

> Firefox (and other browsers) have created a set of states a site can have
> in relationship with ssl certificates, and how to communicate that to the
> user.
>
> Tor Browser has a particular state related to the padlock at the toolbar
> when it comes to .onion services.
>
> This is something that was discussed under this ticket:
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21321
>
> Based on that discussion, we decided that the best solution would be
> treat .onion sites different when we are communicating these states for
> .onion sites at Tor Browser.
>
> The work on this ticket is to map all the current states Firefox has for
> ssl certificates on the padlock, and from there start to build a new way
> to communicate these states when they are related to a .onion sites.
>
> We start mapping them here:
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHkj2DpmFMB0mjHEfehD5ztY2L0lQzKNtZqct1TXbmg/edit
>
> Is still pending the most difficult part of the work, which is to define
> what to do for .onion sites on those states.

New description:

 = Background =

 Firefox (and other browsers) have created a set of states a site can have
 in relationship with ssl certificates, and how to communicate that to the
 user.

 Currently, Tor Browser doesn't communicate ideally to users that visit
 onion sites--i.e. http + onion looks really scary with lots of warnings!
 This is something that was discussed under #21321. We then realized that
 we should look at all the different state + .onion combinations, and
 carefully communicate what these mean to the user.

 = Objective =

 The work on this ticket is to map all the current states Firefox has for
 ssl certificates on the padlock, and from there start to build a new way
 to communicate these states when they are related to a .onion sites. We
 started mapping them here:

 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHkj2DpmFMB0mjHEfehD5ztY2L0lQzKNtZqct1TXbmg/edit

 Is still pending the most difficult part of the work, which is to define
 what to do for .onion sites on those states.

--

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23247#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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