Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-          |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by s7r):

 All this makes sense to me, except I cannot help to ask myself the
 following questions:

 From all the relays I run, I see this warning on just one of them only, I
 see it heavily and the relay in question is an Exit relay with very low
 consensus weight (200 - 350). For example in 11 days and 18 hours of
 uptime for Tor, the warning is logged exactly 112 times.

 A *custom* client triggering this simply cannot pick this particular relay
 so so many times in short periods, especially given its low consensus
 weight and especially that it is an Exit relay so it shouldn't even be
 used in the RP position anyway. If the *custom* client is over-picking
 this relay in a position (RP) that it shouldn't be given its flags, and it
 does not respect the load balancing logic by picking based on consensus
 weights, we want to know why.

 A regular client affected by #21084 should just be using Tor so certainly
 it is at least questionable if it would choose a relay with low consensus
 weight, with the Exit flag in the RP position for so many times on a short
 period of time.

 Good thinking about the downgrade from warn to proto warn - I strongly
 support leaving this at warning level at least until we fix/confirm
 #21084.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:29>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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