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Re: [tor-bugs] #31512 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
#31512: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: thelamper | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: enhancement | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version: Tor:
| unspecified
Severity: Major | Resolution: invalid
Keywords: fingerprinting, fingerprint, user- | Actual Points:
agent switcher |
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by boklm):
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => invalid
Comment:
The user-agent string is the same for all Tor Browser users, so it is not
a fingerprinting vector, and installing a user-agent switcher will not
improve things here (and actually make things worse when you are the only
one doing it).
Regarding randomization of the user-agent, you can read the section
"Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" in the Tor
Browser design documentation:
https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31512#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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