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Re: [tor-bugs] #1297 [Tor Hidden Services]: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout
#1297: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component: Tor Hidden Services | Version: 0.2.2.10-alpha
Resolution: None | Keywords:
Parent: #2552 | Points:
Actualpoints: |
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Changes (by rransom):
* status: assigned => needs_review
Comment:
See
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git/shortlog/refs/heads/bug1297b
bug1297b] ( `https://git.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git bug1297b` ) for a
not-yet-tested branch on 0.2.3.x to make clients keep HS circuits which
have reached their normal CBT around longer while retrying with new
intro/rend circuits.
I will need to add a configuration option to allow users to disable this
new behaviour, because even though it will clearly improve HS connection-
establishment performance (assuming it works correctly), I suspect that it
will harm performance after the connection is established, because we will
now use circuits which took longer to build. We currently do not have
tools designed to test latency on already-opened circuits; when we do, we
will want to investigate this further.
There is one remaining change to make for this ticket, on the service
side: hidden services should be able to keep their
`CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND` circuits open after they time out, while
building another rendezvous circuit in parallel.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1297#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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