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[tor-bugs] #7661 [Tor bundles/installation]: Tor Browser update security

#7661: Tor Browser update security
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 Reporter:  ioerror                   |          Owner:  erinn
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  major                     |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:       
 Keywords:                            |         Parent:       
   Points:                            |   Actualpoints:       
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 I'm watching a user update their Tor Browser and they not only went and
 downloaded it, they opened the .gz, unpacked it and ran it.

 I suspect it would be straightforward to have a small handler for opening
 Tor Browser downloads that verifies the download with a very small build
 of gpgv. Combined with the new Firefox cert pinning, I'd feel rather good
 about downloading updates as we clearly (I hope someone clarifies
 otherwise!) won't have Thandy anytime soon.

 I imagine that it would be a nice way to ensure that there is only one
 leap of faith, ever. The first is unavoidable and afterwards, everything
 else is unnecessary.

 If I wrote a patch to build/include gpgv (with our gpg keys preloaded) -
 would that be something we could ship? Could we easily hook it for
 torproject.org downloads?

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7661>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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