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[tor-bugs] #17768 [Tor]: Measure Hidden Service Rendezvous Path Lengths
#17768: Measure Hidden Service Rendezvous Path Lengths
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Sponsor:
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We're trying to measure the traffic capacity of the Tor Network,
particularly as it relates to hidden services.[0]
But we don't know how long the average hidden service rendezvous path is:
* Either side can have a 3 or 4 hop connection, due to cannibalization
* Clients can use Tor2Web and have one-hop paths
* Servers can or will be able to use (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services,
and have one hop paths
We know it's probably somewhere between 7 and 9 connections / hops, but
that's a large range. And it may shrink as more (R)SOS servers come
online.
Is there a privacy-preserving way of collecting these statistics?
(We'd need to combine stats from clients and hidden services.)
Is it worth doing this as a once-off, or should we (re)design the
collection of a number of privacy-preserving stats?
[0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
dev/2015-November/010001.html
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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17768>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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