[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #17574 [Tor]: Fallback mirrors should never fetch from fallback mirrors
#17574: Fallback mirrors should never fetch from fallback mirrors
--------------------+------------------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_information
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.7-alpha
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #17709 | Points:
Sponsor: |
--------------------+------------------------------------
Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
> Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
> > Deferring this change - it's not clear it's necessary, and the current
behaviour is acceptable:
> > * fallbacks contact the authorities when bootstrapping, or other
fallbacks if all authorities are inaccessible
> > * fallbacks contact the authorities when updating their consensus, or
other directory mirrors if all authorities are inaccessible
> (... or when looking for certs and (micro) descriptors that they
don't currently have, right?)
It depends.
When fetching certs and microdescriptors, directory_get_from_dirserver()
calls directory_fetches_from_authorities() to find out if it should
contact an authority. (This happens regardless of whether tor has a valid
consensus.)
directory_fetches_from_authorities() is a long list of special cases that
would be easier to read if they had less `!` and `||`. But it leads to the
following outcomes:
These tor instances will fetch from the authorities (or the mirrors in the
consensus, or the fallbacks, in that order):
* relays with recently uploaded descriptors that are:
* directory mirrors, and/or
* exits,
* relays that don't know their address, and
* clients with FetchDirInfoEarly set.
All other tor instances will fetch from the mirrors in the consensus (or
the fallbacks, or the authorities, in that order):
* clients,
* bridges,
* hidden services,
* all relays during initial bootstrap, as long as they know their address,
* non-directory, non-exit relays, and
* bridge clients (or maybe they fetch from their bridge(s)).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17574#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs