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Re: [tor-bugs] #20831 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support existing guard torrc options better with new guard code, or deprecate them.

#20831: Support existing guard torrc options better with new guard code, or
deprecate them.
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  nickm                                |          Owner:  nickm
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard regression                 |  Actual Points:  .2
  TorCoreTeam201612                              |
Parent ID:  #20822                               |         Points:  2
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > >I'm not 100% persuaded that NumDirectoryGuards==3 actually offers much
 security, if the top primary guard is malicious. I remember the argument
 about malicious directory guards refusing to serve relay descriptors, but
 I kinda feel that we are screwed anyway if the top primary guard is evil
 since all circuits are going to go through it anyhow.
 >
 > Right.  My rationale here was more strongly influenced by one of the
 comments on #20909 or its kin about how having 3 directory guards
 prevented #20499 from causing major chaos on the network.
 >

 Hmm, interesting. In this case wouldn't it be ideal if Tor consulted the
 second primary guard, if and only if the first primary guard delivered
 expired/corrupted information? Instead of always picking at random between
 the top 3 guards?

 Because with the current patch we end up exposing ourselves to 3 primary
 guards anyhow even if the first primary guard is totally innocent.

 Are we afraid that implementing the above logic would be too much
 engineering time?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20831#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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