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Re: [tor-bugs] #2714 [Metrics/Analysis]: Does using rephist uptime for calculating HSDir produce too much flapping?
#2714: Does using rephist uptime for calculating HSDir produce too much flapping?
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: task | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Analysis | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed
Keywords: SponsorR, tor-auth, tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #13209 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by dgoulet):
* keywords: SponsorR, tor-auth => SponsorR, tor-auth, tor-hs
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => fixed
* severity: => Normal
Comment:
Some basic conclusion out of #13209 experiment. A client getting the
latest consensus at every hour, the churn rate was less than 3% and that
was only '''one''' single HSDir would change out of the set of 6 in that
hour. But it never happened over almost a year of running the HS health
that a service descriptor was not found in the set.
However, this is not really representing reality as clients have different
consensuses and not _only_ the latest one... See #13209 for more
information on the issues of this experiment.
Sooooo we can keep that thing opened forever or flag it that "OK, HSDir so
far aren't moving around much as we observed and we are happy with this".
We should try to measure this a bit better with a "v2.0" of #13209 so we
can overtime measure it and act accordingly if shit hit the fan. We
already have some good ticket going on about improving stability of HSDir
flag and raising the bar as well so those relays stop snooping on .onion
(#19162).
I'm closing this ticket and we'll re-open a new one if we think that it's
becoming an issue at some point.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2714#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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