Re: [tor-bugs] #31582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider disabling AMO search field in add-ons dialog

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#31582: Consider disabling AMO search field in add-ons dialog
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 Reporter:  JeremyRand                |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                            |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by GNUtoo):

 Hi,

 Freedom and privacy are often deeply related to each other.
 For instance we can see here that nonfree addons conflict with both users
 freedom and privacy.

 For users of fully free GNU/Linux distributions and device manufacturers
 like puri.sm privacy is also very important.
 The GNU FSDG (https://www.gnu.org/distros/free-system-distribution-
 guidelines.html) are guidelines that fully free distributions approved by
 the FSF have to follow.

 The nonfree addon repository in the tor-browser is in conflict with such
 guidelines. This is why the tor-browser installer is not packaged in any
 of theses distributions. The tor-browser installer has even been removed
 from PureOS for this reason. This is really problematic because users also
 use such distributions for privacy reasons, and making users choose
 between freedom and privacy is not a good idea.

 One way to deal with that from our side would be to include a patched
 version of the tor-browser in such distributions with the add-on settings
 being changed.

 However if we choose to do it in this way we would need a way to make sure
 that the tor-browser shipped in such distributions cannot be distinguished
 (by a website or the network) from either the stock tor-browser or the one
 used in Tails (depending on if we want an add blocker or not). If there is
 a way to do that (by running tests or something like that) it would be
 good enough for us as we care less about reproducible builds.

 Is something like panopticlick.eff.org a good enough test to make sure of
 that?

 Another way that would permit such distributions to package the tor-
 browser or the tor-browser installer would be to make sure that the tor-
 browser add-on manager doesn't point to nonfree addons, either by
 disabling it or pointing to a repository that only has free addons.

 Removing the add-on manager would also make things more clear for end
 users as having a warning would probably end up providing conflicting
 information to users. For instance for the fullscreen feature, the tor-
 browser now makes sure that users are still protected even if it is
 fullscreen.

 However on another hand this would probably create issues for users that
 depend on specific addons. I've no idea if it's possible to get more
 information on what would make the most sense for the tor-browser project
 or what its users are expecting or how much they understand the
 consequences of installing add-ons.

 For instance for the fullscreen mode I was unaware that it was also
 possible to get the information through CSS when using the safest mode,
 despite knowing about the fingerprinting techniques and how tor works in
 more details that what is usually explained when presenting it.

 Do you have some pointers on what would be the best way to advance on that
 issue?

 Denis.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31582#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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