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Re: [tor-bugs] #3100 [TorBrowserButton]: Reduce security prefs into a few groups

#3100: Reduce security prefs into a few groups
------------------------------------------------------------+---------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry                                       |          Owner:  mikeperry                    
     Type:  defect                                          |         Status:  new                          
 Priority:  major                                           |      Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Component:  TorBrowserButton                                |        Version:                               
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability, MikePerry201302d  |         Parent:                               
   Points:                                                  |   Actualpoints:                               
------------------------------------------------------------+---------------
Description changed by mikeperry:

Old description:

> We should reduce the number of preferences into levels of security rather
> than the myriad of individual behavior controls we have now.
>
> Reducing the number of options can reduce the ability of users to
> fragment themselves into different anonymity sets through fingerprinting.
>
> Our translators will hate us for a while, but there will be less words to
> translate total.
>
> I want to get the set down to the following options:
>
>  - Block all disk writes (Private Browsing Mode)
>  - Prevent third party identifier tracking
>  - Resist browser fingerprint tracking
>  - Disable plugins during Tor usage (crucial)
>
> Those last two might be better as per-site options.
>
> I don't think we need much else. The rest of the options will remain
> buried in about:config.
>
> The last two should also be removed once we get a better per-site Privacy
> UI (see #5273 and the UI mockup in
> https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-
> linkability)

New description:

 We should reduce the number of preferences into levels of security rather
 than the myriad of individual behavior controls we have now.

 Reducing the number of options can reduce the ability of users to fragment
 themselves into different anonymity sets through fingerprinting.

 Our translators will hate us for a while, but there will be less words to
 translate total.

 I want to get the set down to the following options:

  - Block all browsing history (enables Private Browsing Mode)
  - Disable browser plugins (such as Flash)
  - Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data
  - Change details that distinguish you from other Tor Browser users

 Those last two might be better as per-site options.

 I don't think we need much else. The rest of the options will remain
 buried in about:config.

 The last two should also be removed once we get a better per-site Privacy
 UI (see #5273 and the UI mockup in
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-
 linkability)

--

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3100#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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