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Re: [tor-bugs] #7520 [BridgeDB]: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
#7520: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
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Reporter: aagbsn | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: BridgeDB | Version:
Keywords: SponsorL | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by arma):
Replying to [comment:5 aagbsn]:
> Alternately, we could extract yield entirely from the bridge-ips line by
tracking users seen over time. This could be manipulated by a dishonest
bridge operator, or an attacker who generates traffic to known bridges to
boost their ranking and obtain more trust in this system.
I think it's a really hard theoretical problem to distinguish 'real' usage
from artificial usage added by an adversary who controls the country that
we're trying to measure usage from.
> I'm not sure what we can do about this. Are there other ways to estimate
bridge usage without just trusting the bridge self-reporting?
We could do spot checking from trusted users in-country, to make sure that
the bridge remains reachable during the time that it's reporting high
load. That's a variant of the reachability testing approaches from the
blog post above.
I should also note that Damon told me a year or so back that he wants to
pick up the Proximax work and get some grants and some grad students to
work on it. This ticket in particular sounds like it needs a few research
papers written before we have a good handle on what we should deploy. In
particular, one of the first things I'd want to see is a list of attacks
on Proximax that aim to skew its results.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7520#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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