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Re: [tor-bugs] #14139 [Tor Browser]: Tor browser shares its last search term with other browsers on OSX
#14139: Tor browser shares its last search term with other browsers on OSX
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Reporter: clashman | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: osx
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Changes (by teor):
* keywords: => osx
Comment:
'''Background on OS X Pasteboards'''
There are 5 standard OS X pasteboards:
* NSGeneralPboardâfor cut, copy, and paste
* NSRulerPboardâfor copy and paste of rulers
* NSFontPboardâfor cut, copy, and paste of NSFont objects
* NSFindPboardâapplication-specific find panels can share a sought after
text value
* NSDragPboardâfor graphical drag and drop operations
See
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PasteboardGuide106/Articles/pbConcepts.html
Like command-C for Copy and command-V for Paste, the Find Pasteboard can
be accessed using command-E for Save to Find Pasteboard and command-G for
Find Text on Find Pasteboard.
See http://blog.macromates.com/2005/the-shared-find-clipboard/
One (non-recommended) method of disabling the Find Pasteboard is to
swizzle the Objective-C functions responsible for accessing pasteboards,
replacing them with a version that ignores requests for the Find
Pasteboard. This seems to be overkill.
https://github.com/mpak/DisableSearchSharing/blob/master/DisableSearchSharing.m
'''Issues with Disabling the Find Pasteboard'''
If we never write anything to the Find Pasteboard:
* will this stop Find Again / command-G working? (maybe)
* or will we have to provide our own implementation of Find Again?
(maybe)
* should we continue to allow the General and Drag Pasteboards to work,
even in incognito mode? (yes, this is what users expect)
* could the Ruler or Font Pasteboards ever leak enough information to be
an issue? (unlikely)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14139#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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