[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #14899 [Tor]: Enable Tor to work without using filesystem for cached files
#14899: Enable Tor to work without using filesystem for cached files
-----------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: naif | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: globaleaks-wants
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
-----------------------------+------------------------------
Comment (by yawning):
So I think this would be a good idea, but it's probably a long term
project, and hard to do correctly.
Specifically, while the list of files you gave is sufficient (overkill
really) for a client, it does not encompass all of the state that needs to
be serialized if the tor instance is more than a client.
Cutting things down to the minimal list, a client needs to persist `state`
so the guards are preserved.
A relay/bridge/whatever will additionally need to persist:
* keys/*
* pt_state/* (depending on the configured pluggable transports).
Everything else can be regenerated/redownloaded, I think (under the
assumption that HSes will all be ephemeral).
Open design questions:
* How much of the optional state to keep.
* Should tor instances that are acting as bridges/relays support this?
* Designing a serialization format.
* Coming up with good commands.
* Figuring out exact behavior (Eg: I *assume* loading serialized state
should only be allowed as the first authenticated control command given to
a tor instance that was launched with `DisableNetwork 1`. If reloading
state can happen at an arbitrary point in time, things get kind of scary.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14899#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs