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Re: [tor-bugs] #14917 [Tor]: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about hidden service's guard relay

Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #14917 [Tor]: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about hidden service's guard relay
From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2015 13:49:46 -0000
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#14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about hidden service's guard
relay
------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma    |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  SponsorR, tor-hs
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 GuardA -> Middle -> GuardA is too bizarre for anyone monitoring the
 network and sends red flags.

 Other possible solution for the EntryNode situation are:
 1) Disregard EntryNode and connect to a second guard as usual.
 2) Increase the hop by one just for this situation. GuardA -> Middle1 ->
 Middle2 -> GuardA
 3) Fail and say we told you not to mess with the selection path.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14917#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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References:
- [tor-bugs] #14917 [Tor]: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about hidden service's guard relay
  - From: Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

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