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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: teor
Type: enhancement | Status:
Priority: High | needs_revision
Component: Tor | Milestone: Tor:
Severity: Normal | 0.2.8.x-final
Keywords: 028-triaged, tor-hs, | Version:
TorCoreTeam201602 | Resolution:
Parent ID: | Actual Points:
Sponsor: SponsorU | Points: large
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Replying to [comment:39 teor]:
All fixes look good!
[snip]
>
> I think that you're right, if you use a Tor2web client with a HS, or run
a standard tor client as a RSOS, you lose anonymity.
>
> So let's prevent that. See bae2a4de61d6d440840411fb992ffc72ad04c660.
Ok I see that this is extra protection since somehow a client using an
RSOS tor instance is distinguishable in some ways? (comment in or.h):
{{{
+ * location-anonymous. However, client use of a RSOS may be
statistically
+ * distinguishable.
}}}
As a last change, I would document that part in the manpage for the option
`RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer`. It changes things a bit
because now the server that host a RSOS needs a second tor for any other
client usage which is not that easy to have in a standard Linux distro
(systemd and all only manage one single tor). As long as the user as a way
to learn that before setting it up, it's fine.
Thanks!
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:42>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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