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Re: [tor-bugs] #17965 [Tor Browser]: Isolate HPKP pinning to url bar domain
#17965: Isolate HPKP pinning to url bar domain
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: tbb-
Type: defect | team
Priority: High | Status:
Component: Tor Browser | needs_revision
Severity: Normal | Milestone:
Keywords: tbb-linkability, | Version:
TorBrowserTeam201602 | Resolution:
Parent ID: | Actual Points:
Sponsor: | Points:
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Changes (by gk):
* keywords: tbb-linkability, TorBrowserTeam201602R => tbb-linkability,
TorBrowserTeam201602
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Do we have any numbers on how many extensions are actually using the
methods in nsSiteSecurityService? I fear there are a bunch and it seems
that already one is enough to make the whole Tor Browser unusable.
This is in `needs_revision` because I think the approach does not work,
especially if we think about upstreaming that patch (apart from the fact
that the HTTPS-E patch is either wrong because HTTPS-E is used to a great
deal outside of the Tor Browser context, too (and there is no
`isSecureChannel()` available) or not sufficient as we would need to patch
HTTPS-E for us during the bundling step).
So, what about this: we introduce an `nsISiteSecurityService2` containing
the changes we want and then we make sure that callers from a non-chrome
context + chrome context we control (i.e. browser chrome) are using that.
That would leave the extensions unbroken. I guess given the things
extensions can already do and that we need to trust them anyway the
HSTS/HPKP bits do not matter much for now. This idea would probably make
it easier for us to get our patch upstreamed as nothing existing would
break + it would outline a proper way forward: Mozilla could start
deprecating `nsISiteSecurityService` in favor of
`nsISiteSecurityService2`. This would allow us getting rid of
`nsSIteSecruityService` in extensions as well eventually.
Another thing we could do is try to to talk to some Mozilla devs about
whether they know a better solution that they would merge (instead).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17965#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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