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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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Reporter: ioerror | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: security, privacy, anonymity | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Sponsor: |
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Comment (by ioerror):
Replying to [comment:17 arthuredelstein]:
> Maybe CloudFlare could be persuaded to use CAPTCHAs more precisely?
>
> That is, present a CAPTCHA only when:
> 1. the server owner has specifically requested that CAPTCHAs be used
> 2. the server is actively under DoS attack, and
> 3. the client's IP address is currently a source of the DoS.
That seems interesting - I wish we had data to understand if these choices
would help - it seems opaque how "threat scores" for IP addresses are
computed. Is there any public information about it?
>
> I think it's hugely overkill to show CAPTCHAs all the time to all Tor
users for every CloudFlare site. It's also unreasonable to maintain a
"reputation" for a Tor exit node.
I agree.
> On top of this, Google's reCAPTCHA is buggy and frequently impossible to
solve. Has CloudFlare considered other CAPTCHAs, or discussed reCAPTCHA's
problems with Google?
I'm also interested in understanding the dataflow - could the FBI go to
Google to get data on all CloudFlare users? Does CF protect it? If so -
who protects users more?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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