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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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Reporter: ioerror | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: security, privacy, anonymity | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Sponsor: |
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Comment (by ioerror):
Replying to [comment:38 jgrahamc]:
> Replying to [comment:34 ioerror]:
> > Replying to [comment:30 jgrahamc]:
> > > A related approach might be for us to say "Let's whitelist all the
Tor exit nodes". Play that forward a bit and you could see that any abuser
worth their salt would migrate to Tor increasing the abuse problem through
Tor.
> >
> > That would be a fine approach - it is true that this could be a
problem but this would absolutely solve the "defaults" problem we see
today.
>
> It's a very short term solution because if all the abuse moves to Tor
the obvious next step is that our clients come along and demand that we
give them the option to block visitors from Tor completely. If we go that
way wholesale I think it will be negative for everyone.
Treating Tor as special seems to make sense as it is already treated
specially as as ~1600 nodes shared by millions of users seems to just
utterly ruin ip reputation schemes.
I also find it hard to believe that "all the abuse" will move to Tor. Even
if a great deal of it moved to Tor, we have lots of users and lots of
traffic that is not abusive traffic.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:48>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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