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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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Reporter: ioerror | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: security, privacy, anonymity | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Sponsor: |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Replying to [comment:182 jgrahamc]:
> I'm not sure how you come up with the 5% number but I think you
underestimate how complicated deciding what R/O is in the web. Plenty of
attacks come through GET requests. Doing the R/O mode seems like a nasty
hack.
To me R/O would be delivering the cache that you have. The request would
never see the actual website. This would also discourage adversaries that
repeatedly pull websites to have an automated advantage at idk ticket
sales as the cache does not have to be the most recent.
I mean seriously. How hard can it be to deliver the cache instead of a
captcha? I can't imagine that this takes one of your junior software
engineers more than two hours to implement and then a day to deploy. But
please give us better estimates, so we have an idea of what we are
actually demanding here.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:184>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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