Re: [tor-bugs] #21493 [Core Tor/Tor]: When reachable addresses change, mark connections using those addresses

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#21493: When reachable addresses change, mark connections using those addresses
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor          |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6          |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:                |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > > > ...
 > > > keeping in mind things like long-running non-resumable transfers,
 IRC, and similar applications where a broken connection is a nuisance, and
 times when the client wants to keep a change in their reachable addresses
 (that could be due to changing location) private, it seems best for this
 behavior to be configurable.
 > >
 > > The behaviour is configurable in this design: if you don't want tor to
 terminate your connections, don't tell it that those addresses are
 unreachable. Anything else changes the semantics of reachable addresses.
 > >
 > > If you want to be able to prefer smaller sets of addresses than the
 whole of IPv4 or IPv6, that's another feature ticket - please feel free to
 open it.
 > The option needed is for when the client wants to modify their reachable
 addresses and seamlessly move new streams to better circuits, consistent
 with how changes in ExitNodes, and so on, affect existing streams.

 Entry guard changes are different, and have always been different.
 Turns out this feature was implemented as I described as part of prop271.

 Please feel free to open a feature ticket for the transition you describe:
 but be aware that we don't tend to add new options for rare use cases,
 particularly if they have security implications.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21493#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs