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Re: [tor-bugs] #25150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid malloc/free on each server-side ntor handshake
#25150: Avoid malloc/free on each server-side ntor handshake
-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner: nickm
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.4.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: c99 malloc performance ntor | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #23777 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by dgoulet):
Hmm this fails with fragile hardening. I expect any distro building with
this might end up not able to compile tor :S.
{{{
src/or/onion.c:532:1: error: stack protector not protecting local
variables: variable length buffer [-Werror=stack-protector]
onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
}}}
I've looked at this and there are two callsites for
`onion_skin_server_handshake` that both passes a stack pointer and a fixed
length.
Maybe we could modify the callers to pass a full buffer containing the
keys + nonce instead?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25150#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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