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[tor-bugs] #25193 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: Avoid blacklisting Exit relays
#25193: dos: Avoid blacklisting Exit relays
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Reporter: dgoulet | Owner: dgoulet
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: Very | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
High |
Component: Core | Version:
Tor/Tor | Keywords: tor-dos, tor-relay, 029-backport,
Severity: Normal | 031-backport, 032-backport
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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It is possible to do "tor-in-tor" meaning a tor client connection can exit
the network and come back at a Guard node.
And if this happens to be detected by the DoS subsystem, we'll blacklist
the Exit relay for a while. That is *NOT* good.
Now that we have #25183, we can lookup the inbound address to learn if we
know it. And if we do, don't consider it a potential malicious client that
we need to look at.
That is one part of the solution, the second part is #2667 so we actually
prevent reentry from Exit but that part won't be backported just yet (if
ever).
This work will be part of #24902 so once merge_ready, it will be merged
into my branch `ticket24902_029_05`.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25193>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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