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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
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Reporter: gk | Owner: legind
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_information
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS | Version:
Everywhere |
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by legind):
> Okay, so the item is meant to display the last date when those rulesets
got *fetched*? Or is it meant to show the version of the currently
*active* rulesets? My intuition (and that of the user who reported that
bug) is the latter, because that's what I as a user care about. It seems
to me then that the item should not "lie" to the user regardless whether
the check on start-up is succeeding or not (it might in fact even fail
outside of Tor Browser/unrelated to it for various reasons).
Yes, it's the latter. I don't quite understand your point about the
extension lieing to the user. If the rulesets have been downloaded and
applied, it displays it. If not, it will not display the ruleset line.
> Extension update checks are not on the same schedule as ruleset update
checks, so what happens if you update your extension (because there is a
new version available) but you already had *newer* rulesets installed? Do
those newer rulesets get overwritten by the ones shipped with the
extension?
Out-of-band downloaded rulesets, if present, will always take precedence
over extension-bundled rulesets. We also always make a ruleset release on
the same day as an extension release, to minimize the cases where a user
has an old out-of-band ruleset and a newer extension.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29454#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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