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Re: [tor-bugs] #2317 [Tor Client]: Missing sanity checks for cbtnummodes consensus parameter
#2317: Missing sanity checks for cbtnummodes consensus parameter
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Reporter: Sebastian | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
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Comment(by arma):
{{{
research indicates that a lower value would mean fewer cells in
transit in the network at any given time. Obeyed by Tor 0.2.1.20
and later.
+ Min: 1, Max: 100000 XXX are these sane
}}}
If an exit relay sets its circ package window higher than 1000, it will
cause current Tor clients that use it to close those circuits because it
will violate their deliver_window >= 0 checks.
But if we later change Tor clients to handle that better (e.g. to read the
circwindow out of the consensus and assume that exit relays are using that
value), then we wouldn't want to have put a constraint in.
Also, if the circ package window is 1, current Tor clients will fail to
use that circuit well, because they won't send any sendmes back until
they've gotten 100 cells. So we could argue for a minimum of 100. But at
the same time, I don't want to dictate to future clients what their
constraints should be, in case we change the sendme design in the future.
So why not [0, MAX_INT32] here?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2317#comment:21>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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