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Re: [tor-bugs] #7877 [Metrics Website]: Web interface for looking up bridge status?
#7877: Web interface for looking up bridge status?
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: closed
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Metrics Website | Version:
Resolution: duplicate | Keywords:
Parent: | Points:
Actualpoints: |
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Changes (by karsten):
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => duplicate
Comment:
Atlas/Onionoo are actually quite close to what you describe. The missing
piece is that Atlas takes a 40-character hex input, applies SHA-1 on it
using JavaScript, sends the result to Onionoo, and displays the obtained
bridge details. That is described in #6320, which is why I'm closing this
ticket as duplicate. Please add more thoughts to that ticket, or re-open
this ticket if you meant something else.
What we should avoid, if we can, is sending an unhashed bridge fingerprint
to Onionoo. While this isn't as problematic on yatei (because it enforces
https and strips parameters from sanitized web logs), it's going to be
problematic as soon as people use other Onionoo instances than the
"official" one. It's best if Onionoo doesn't learn unhashed bridge
fingerprints in the first place. The Atlas/Onionoo solution in #6320
doesn't have this problem.
Querying Tonga directly does indeed look like a dead end: this doesn't
give us bridge pool assignment information; querying Tonga means putting
even more load on it. We can probably come up with more problems the
longer we think about it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7877#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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