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Re: [tor-bugs] #24815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period



#24815: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period
------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor              |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect            |         Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium            |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor      |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                    |        Sponsor:
------------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 dgoulet]:
 > I suppose you are talking about the log on Jan 7th but the upcoming
 round on Jan 6th:
 >
 > {{{
 > Jan 07 09:48:14.984 [info] sr_state_update: SR: State prepared for
 upcoming voting period (2018-01-06 23:00:00). Upcoming phase is reveal
 (counters: 0 commit & 1 reveal rounds).
 > }}}
 >
 > That time (`2018-01-06 23:00:00`) is the `valid_after` from the
 consensus and the SR subsystem only uses the time from the consensus to
 take every timing decision. It updates the state when loading from disk
 (at bootup) or when a new consensus has just been computed.
 >
 > In this case, it is when booting up (`sr_init()`) I presume?

 No, waking from sleep.

 > So it takes the consensus from disk (very old), and tries to vote with
 that information. Ultimately it will fail but then once your dirauth gets
 the latest consensus, it should sync up again with the whole dance at the
 next voting round.
 >
 > Do you see that or I'm misunderstanding the issue or ?

 There are times when it never syncs up.
 Sometimes it will be out of sync for hours, and other times it won't get
 back in sync until I restart the Tor process.

 I need to do some debugging to find out why it produces a different
 consensus to everyone else.
 I assumed it was shared random because of these warning messages.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24815#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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